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INTRODUCTION
Many commentators who favor expansions in international law also favor
restrictions on executive authority. What these commentators often fail to
recognize is the potential for conflict between these two commitments. In
this Article, I consider one example of this potential conflict: the effect
under international law of signed but unratified treaties.
Under contemporary treaty practice, a nation’s signature of a treaty, espe-
cially a multilateral treaty, typically does not make the nation a party to the
treaty. Rather, nations become parties to treaties by an act of ratification or
accession, either by depositing an instrument of ratification or accession
with a depositary (for multilateral treaties) or exchanging instruments of
ratification (for bilateral treaties). The signing of treaties under this practice
is at most an indication that the terms of the treaty are satisfactory to the
executive institution in that nation charged with negotiating and signing
treaties and does not constitute a promise that the nation will become a
party to the treaty.
Despite the modern separation between signature and ratification, many
international lawyers and academics contend that when a nation signs a
treaty, it is bound to refrain from actions that would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty until such time as it makes clear its intention not to
become a party to the treaty. This obligation is reflected in Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), a treaty
that itself governs the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties.
Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, many
commentators claim that Article 18 reflects customary international law
that is binding on nations that have not joined the Convention, a claim that
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the United States has not denied.1 In addition, some commentators have
made broad claims about the content of the object and purpose obligation,
arguing that it either binds signatory nations not to violate a treaty at all or
that it binds them not to violate any of the “core” or “important” provi-
sions in the treaty.2 These claims are frequently made, for example, in con-
nection with the U.S. signature of human rights treaties, such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.3
Treaties are signed for the United States by the president and his agents.
As a result, any international obligations that the United States would incur
as a result of signing a treaty would be triggered by unilateral executive
action. This sort of unilateral executive authority, however, appears to be in
tension with the process specified in Article II of the Constitution for mak-
ing treaties, which requires the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Sen-
ate.4 As I will explain, this tension is not eliminated by the existence of the
president’s power to enter into “sole executive agreements.” Whatever its
precise scope, the sole executive agreement power must be significantly nar-
rower than the power to enter into Article II treaties.
The extent of this constitutional tension, however, depends on the
breadth of the signing obligation. The drafting history of Article 18 sug-
gests that the signing obligation was intended to be narrower than some
commentators have assumed. This obligation is best construed as precluding
only actions that would substantially undermine the ability of the parties to
comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after ratification. Considered in
these terms, the obligation has little relevance to many types of treaties,
such as human rights treaties, where pre-ratification conduct inconsistent
with the treaty is not likely to undo the bargain reflected in the treaty.
Adopting this narrow interpretation of the object and purpose obligation
helps reduce the gap between presidential authority under the Constitution
and international law. Nevertheless, because there is still some potential for
constitutional conflict, and because the object and purpose obligation is un-
defined in the text of the Vienna Convention, the Senate should be attentive
to this issue if it is to preserve its already diminished role in the treaty
process.
Part I of this Article describes the phenomenon of signed but unratified
treaties and discusses some of the reasons for this phenomenon. Part II dis-
cusses the effect under modern international law of signing a treaty and
explains how some commentators have claimed that signing a treaty obli-
1. See infra text accompanying notes 34–36. Customary international law is the law of the interna-
tional community that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 37–42.
3. See infra text accompanying note 38.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that the president has the power to make treaties “by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur”).
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gates the United States either to comply with the treaty in its entirety or to
comply with the “core” or “important” terms of the treaty. Part III argues
that broad obligations arising from signature are in tension with the U.S.
constitutional process for making treaties, and that this tension is not elimi-
nated by the president’s power to conclude sole executive agreements. Part
IV explains how the drafting history of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
suggests that the scope of the object and purpose obligation is narrower than
is sometimes assumed, thus resolving some of the constitutional tension
posed by signing obligations.
I. THE PHENOMENON OF SIGNED BUT UNRATIFIED TREATIES
Throughout its history, the United States has signed numerous treaties
that it has not subsequently ratified.5 This phenomenon has been especially
evident in the last several decades, during which time the United States has
signed, but has not yet ratified, a variety of important multilateral treaties.
These treaties include significant human rights agreements such as the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (signed in
1977); the American Convention on Human Rights (signed in 1977); the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men (signed in 1980); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(signed in 1995). They also include important environmental treaties such
as the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (signed in 1998); the Rio Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (signed in 1993); and an agreement revising the seabed mining provi-
sions of the Law of the Sea Convention (signed in 1994). Another set of
treaties that have been signed but not ratified, much discussed in connection
with the post-September 11 war on terrorism, are the First and Second Ad-
ditional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (signed in 1977). Finally, the
United States has signed but not ratified a number of private international
law treaties.6
That the United States has not ratified these treaties to date does not
necessarily mean that the United States will not become a party to them. At
least since World War I, it has not been uncommon for a significant period
of time to elapse between the United States’ signature and ratification of a
treaty. Two particularly dramatic examples are the Geneva Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which the United States signed
5. See UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1976 (Christian L. Wiktor
ed., 1979) (documenting over 400 treaties that the United States signed but did not ratify between 1776
and 1976); see also U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Pending Treaties, http://foreign.senate.
gov/treaties.pdf (last updated Jan. 31, 2007) (listing treaties currently pending in the Senate); U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, LIST OF TREATIES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, 1789-1934 (1935).
6. See U.S. Department of State, Private International Law, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2007).
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in 1925 but did not ratify until 1975, fifty years later,7 and the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the
United States signed in 1948 but did not ratify until 1989, forty-one years
later.8 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which the United States signed in 1980, is an example of a
signed treaty that may eventually be ratified. In 2002, despite objections
from the Bush Administration, the Democratic-controlled Senate Foreign
Relations Committee voted to send the Convention to the full Senate for
advice and consent.9 Although no vote was held at that time in the Senate,
many supporters of the Convention continue to be hopeful of U.S.
ratification.10
There are a number of reasons why the United States may sign but not
ratify a treaty. The president might submit a treaty to the Senate and have it
defeated there, although this happens only rarely. Two prominent examples
are the Versailles Treaty, which established the League of Nations, and the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.11 More likely, a president might
withhold submission of the treaty to the Senate because of perceived opposi-
tion in that body, perhaps with the hope that the Senate’s position — and
perhaps its composition — would change. This appears to have been the
case, for example, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
the Clinton Administration signed in 1995 but did not submit to the Sen-
ate. In addition, a president may submit a treaty to the Senate and have it
languish there, once its supporters in the Senate realize that they do not have
sufficient votes for advice and consent. One apparent example of this phe-
nomenon is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, which was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1994 and sent to the full Senate for consideration, but which
the full Senate ultimately sent back to the Committee. As noted above, the
Committee sent this treaty back to the full Senate in 2002, but the Senate
once again declined to act on it. A president might also sign a treaty with-
out being committed to ratification, perhaps in an effort to stay involved in
subsequent negotiations related to the treaty or in the institutions estab-
lished by the treaty, or for symbolic political benefits.
7. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force
Feb. 8, 1928; for the United States Oct. 4, 1975).
8. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; for the United States
Feb. 23, 1989).
9. See James Dao, Senate Panel Approves Treaty Banning Bias Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002,
at A1.
10. See, e.g., Ellen Chesler, International Holdout: Around the World, Empowering Women Is Considered
Essential. So Why Isn’t America on Board?, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2004, at A27.
11. See U.S. Senate, Treaties, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.
htm#5 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) (listing twenty-one treaties that have been rejected by the Senate over
the course of U.S. history).
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Yet another reason why a treaty might be signed by the United States but
remain unratified is a change in policy that occurs as a result of a new presi-
dential administration. Such a change of policy has occurred on a number of
occasions. For example, President Carter signed the SALT II nuclear reduc-
tion treaty in 1979, but the Reagan Administration announced in 1982 that
the United States had no intention of ratifying that treaty. Secretary of State
Alexander Haig explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
“[t]his proposal has been abandoned by this administration,” and that “we
consider SALT II dead and have so informed the Soviets.”12 Similarly, the
Reagan Administration announced in 1987 that it would not ratify the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, which
President Carter had signed in 1977. President Reagan explained in a mes-
sage to the Senate that the Protocol was “fundamentally and irreconcilably
flawed,” that the problems with the Protocol were “so fundamental in char-
acter that they cannot be remedied through reservations,” and that he there-
fore had “decided not to submit the Protocol to the Senate in any form.”13
The treaty establishing the International Criminal Court provides a more
recent and much discussed example of how a change in policy can affect the
United States’ position with respect to a signed but unratified treaty. This
treaty was adopted in 1998 and, after receiving the requisite number of
ratifications, entered into force in 2002.14 Under that treaty, an interna-
tional court, based in The Hague, Netherlands, was given jurisdiction to try
the offenses of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Despite
expressing a number of concerns about what he called “significant flaws” in
the treaty, President Clinton had the United States sign it shortly before
leaving office.15 The Bush Administration subsequently sent a letter to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, however, announcing that the
12. See Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong.
121 (1982).
13. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 29, 1987), re-
printed in Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War
Victims, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (1987). Among other things, President Reagan expressed concern that the
First Additional Protocol would “grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not satisfy the
traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian population and otherwise comply
with the laws of war.” Id. at 911. Some commentators have perceived a conflict between that concern and
the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 treatment of terrorists as enemy combatants.
14. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 120, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. As of September 2006, 102 nations were parties to this treaty. See United
Nations Treaty Collection, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
15. See President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signature of the International Criminal Court
Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonly/library/hot_releases/December_31_
2000.html. President Clinton expressed the view that, with signature, the United States would “be in a
position to influence the evolution of the Court,” whereas “[w]ithout signature, we will not.” Id. Senator
Jesse Helms complained that “President Clinton’s decision to sign the Rome treaty establishing an
International Criminal Court in his final days in office is as outrageous as it is inexplicable . . . . Today’s
action is a blatant attempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands of his successor.” Press Release,
Jesse Helms, Senate Foreign Relations Comm. Chairman, Helms Press Release on Clinton’s Signature
(Dec. 31, 2000), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Helms_Sign.pdf.
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United States had no intention of ratifying that treaty.16 The Bush Adminis-
tration’s action has been colloquially referred to as “unsigning,” although
there was no attempt to physically remove the Clinton Administration’s ear-
lier signature.
The Bush Administration’s disavowal of the International Criminal Court
treaty was more formal than disavowals of other signed but unratified trea-
ties. The variation in how administrations have handled unratified treaties
relates in part to the fact that the executive branch has multiple audiences.
In signaling its intent not to be bound by a treaty, the executive branch
must consider both an international audience consisting of, in particular, the
other treaty parties, and a domestic audience consisting of interest groups
and their supporters in Congress who favor or oppose the treaty.17 At times,
the executive branch may attempt to suggest to the other treaty parties that
it has no intention of ratifying, while leaving the matter somewhat ambigu-
ous in order to avoid the domestic fallout associated with clear disavowal of
the treaty. This fallout can emanate from both supporters of the particular
treaty and opponents of other treaties who may demand similar disavowals.
The Bush Administration’s statements concerning the Kyoto Protocol are
a good example of this ambiguity. The Administration has repeatedly ex-
pressed opposition to the treaty, but it has never sent a formal notice to the
Secretary-General disavowing the treaty, notwithstanding requests from
critics of the treaty that it do so.18 Shortly after the Administration sent its
notice concerning the International Criminal Court treaty, the Under Secre-
tary of State for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, responded to a letter from
the Competitive Enterprise Institute requesting that the United States take
steps to make clear that it had no intention of ratifying the Kyoto Proto-
col.19 Ms. Dobriansky noted that “President Bush and this administration
have made clear on numerous occasions that the Kyoto Protocol is fatally
flawed and that the United States will not participate in it,” and she stated
that “[w]e have gone to considerable lengths, internationally, over the past
year to make our position with respect to the Kyoto Protocol clear and un-
ambiguous.”20 Ms. Dobriansky did not make “clear and unambiguous,”
16. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y for Arms Control & Int’l Sec., U.S. Dep’t of State, to
Kofi Annan, Sec’y General, United Nations (May 6, 2002), available at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/
9968.htm [hereinafter Bolton Letter]; see also Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify Inter-
national Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm
(discussing the U.S. announcement).
17. In other words, there is what the political scientist Robert Putnam has referred to as a “two-level
game.” See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L
ORG. 427 (1988); see also LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: The Interaction of Domestic and Interna-
tional Institutions (Daniel W. Drezner ed., 2003).
18. See, e.g., Christopher C. Horner & Iain Murray, Why the United States Should Remove Its Signature
from the Kyoto Protocol, MONTHLY PLANET, Sept. 2004, available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/4254.pdf.
19. See Letter from Paula Dobriansky, Under Sec’y for Global Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Christo-
pher C. Horner, Counsel, Cooler Heads Coalition (May 14, 2002), available at http://www.cei.org/gen-
con/003,03044.cfm.
20. Id.
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however, why the Administration would not send a letter to the Secretary-
General concerning the Protocol, as it had done for the International Crimi-
nal Court treaty.21
II. LEGAL EFFECT OF SIGNING A TREATY
Under international law, a nation does not become a party to a treaty
until it expresses its “consent to be bound.”22 Traditionally, this consent
could be expressed in a variety of ways, including through a nation’s signa-
ture of the treaty.23 Under modern practice, however, signature is not typi-
cally regarded as a manifestation of consent to be bound, especially for
multilateral treaties. Instead, consent is manifested through a subsequent act
of ratification — the deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession
with a treaty depositary in the case of multilateral treaties, and the exchange
of instruments of ratification in the case of bilateral treaties.24 It has also
long been settled that the act of signing a treaty does not obligate a nation
to ratify the treaty.25 The separation between signature and ratification for
modern treaties reflects the domestic law of many countries, which requires
that the executive obtain legislative approval before concluding treaties.
When the Western world was composed primarily of monarchies, signa-
ture was typically viewed as consent to be bound, since monarchs (and thus
their agents) had the authority to unilaterally bind their nations to trea-
ties.26 The central issue under that regime was one of agency, that is,
whether the purported representative of the monarch actually had the au-
thority to make the commitment.27 “Ratification” under that regime re-
ferred simply to the monarch’s confirmation that the agent had acted with
21. A somewhat similar example is the State Department’s failure to answer a 2003 letter from Sena-
tor Jon Kyl asking for clarification of the status of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See Al
Kamen, A Nomination on Hold, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2004, at A13 (referring to an unanswered 2003
letter from Senator Kyl to Secretary of State Colin Powell). But cf. Response of Sec’y of State Condoleezza
Rice to a Question for the Record Submitted by Sen. Joseph Biden (No. 12), Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, Feb. 16, 2005, reprinted in 151 CONG. REC. S8532 (daily ed. July 20, 2005) (noting that “the U.S.
does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to it”). For concerns expressed by Senator Kyl
about obligations that may be entailed by the signature of treaties, see U.S. SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY
COMM., UNRATIFIED AND UNSIGNED TREATIES STILL CONSTRAIN U.S. ACTION (2006), http://rpc.senate.
gov/files/May1605UnsignedTreatiesMS.pdf.
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 2(1)(b), 11–17, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 75
(2000).
23. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 11. R
24. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 113 (Comm. Print 2001) [hereinafter CRS Study].
25. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 22, at 83; J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION 79 R
(1946); ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 87–88 (1938).
26. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582 (6th ed. 2003); FRANCIS O.
WILCOX, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 21–22 (1935).
27. See, e.g., JOSE SETTE CAMARA, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 23-28 (1949).
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authority in signing the treaty.28 The modern separation of signature and
ratification can be traced back to the period of the U.S. and French revolu-
tions, when those two countries added a clause that reserved ratification in
the Full Powers they gave to their negotiators.29 The United States repeat-
edly had to remind other countries during the nineteenth century that its
signature did not constitute a promise of ratification.30 Eventually, “Euro-
pean governments ceased to protest against the American practice; and unra-
tified treaties became a common feature of international relations.”31 Even as
the United States maintained that position, however, there was a holdover of
the older notion of ratification, whereby some U.S. courts, consistent with
the international presumption at that time, deemed treaties that were rati-
fied by the United States to be retroactive to the time of the U.S. signa-
ture.32 This view was eventually abandoned both in the United States and
abroad, and the modern presumption under international law is that treaties
do not operate retroactively.33
Today, although signing is not typically viewed as a manifestation of con-
sent to be bound to a treaty, many international law academics and lawyers
contend that signing does impose certain obligations on the signatory coun-
try. This contention is based on a provision in the Vienna Convention, a
treaty that regulates the formation, interpretation, and termination of trea-
ties. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention states that a nation that signs a
treaty is “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose” of the treaty “until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty.”34 Although the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, executive branch officials have stated on a number
of occasions that they view much of the Convention as reflecting binding
customary international law.35 Moreover, when the executive branch ini-
28. See Martin A. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 ME.
L. REV. 263, 268 n.12 (1980).
29. See JONES, supra note 25, at 74. Treaties concluded by the United States prior to the Constitution, R
such as trade and alliance treaties with France during the Revolutionary War and the peace treaty with
Great Britain that ended the war, specifically called for an exchange of ratifications after signature, and
the Articles of Confederation provided that treaties had to be approved by a supermajority of the Conti-
nental Congress.
30. See JONES, supra note 25, at 76–77; see also, e.g., 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNA- R
TIONAL LAW 189 (1906) (describing a treaty negotiation with Spain in 1819 in which Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams explained to the Spanish minister that “by the nature of our Constitution, the full
powers of our ministers never are or can be unlimited”).
31. JONES, supra note 25, at 77. R
32. See J. Mervyn Jones, The Retroactive Effect of the Ratification of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 51 (1935);
see also Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2069 n.38 (2003).
33. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 28. R
34. Id. art. 18.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, R
at 145, 145 n.2 (documenting executive branch statements). The United States has signed the Vienna
Convention. There is thus a further question of whether the Article 18 object and purpose obligation
applies, as a matter of customary international law, to the U.S. signature of the Vienna Convention itself
and, if so, what that obligation entails. For example, as a signatory to the Vienna Convention, is the
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tially sought Senate ratification of the Vienna Convention, State Department
officials specifically described the Article 18 object and purpose obligation
as a codification of customary international law, and State Department offi-
cials have since repeated this description.36
If the United States is bound by international law not to defeat the object
and purpose of treaties that it has signed but not ratified, then the unilateral
signature of the president or his agent can bind the United States to certain
international legal obligations. Commentators have made a variety of claims
in recent years concerning U.S. obligations under signed but unratified trea-
ties. For example, Article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
prohibits the use of the death penalty for anyone who committed their of-
fense under the age of eighteen, and some commentators have claimed that
U.S. execution of such juvenile offenders — something permitted in a num-
ber of U.S. states before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons37
— violated the object and purpose of the Convention.38 Another example
concerns the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Despite the Senate’s
rejection of that treaty in 1999 by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight, which
meant that the treaty lacked majority, let alone two-thirds, support, the
United States perhaps bound not to violate Article 18 because doing so would defeat the object and
purpose of that treaty? For reasons discussed below in Part IV, the answer should be no.
36. The Nixon Administration signed the Vienna Convention in 1970 and transmitted it to the
Senate in 1971. In its Letter of Submittal to the President, the State Department described the Conven-
tion as “set[ting] forth a generally agreed body of rules to govern all aspects of treaty making and treaty
observance.” Letter of Submittal from William P. Rogers, U.S. Sec’y of State, to President Richard M.
Nixon (Oct. 18, 1971), in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (Nov. 22, 1971). In commenting on Article
18’s object and purpose rule, the State Department observed that “[t]his rule is widely recognized in
customary international law.” Id. at 2. In response to a 1979 letter from fourteen Senators expressing
concern about possible legal obligations that might be entailed by U.S. signature of the Law of the Sea
Convention, Ambassador Elliot Richardson stated that signature “imposes no obligation other than re-
fraining from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty,” and that “[t]he Vienna
Convention provisions, including Article 18, are for the most part codifications of customary interna-
tional law.” The Law of Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1979 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 692. In 2001, in an answer to a question for the record posed
by Senator Jesse Helms, Secretary of State Colin Powell reaffirmed the State Department’s view that
Article 18 reflects customary international law. See Treaties and Other International Agreements, 2001
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 212–13.
37. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the execution of juvenile offenders
(i.e., those people who commit capital offenses while under the age of 18) constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although the Court did not
rely on the U.S. signature of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it did note that every nation in
the world except for the United States and Somalia had ratified the Convention. Id. at 576. In his dissent,
Justice Scalia argued, in reference to the U.S. failure to ratify the Convention, that “[u]nless the Court
has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf of the United States, I cannot see
how this evidence favors, rather than refutes, its position.” Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death Penalty
System Inconsistent with International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793, 2812 (1999) (com-
ments of Professor William Schabas); Connie de la Vega & Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the United
States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Juvenile Death Penalty in Michael Domingues v.
State of Nevada, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 215, 224 (1999). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death
Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 512–13 (2002) (disputing this claim).
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Clinton Administration and some commentators maintained that the
United States still had an obligation under the treaty to avoid testing nu-
clear weapons by virtue of its earlier signature.39 Still another example is the
First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Commentators have
claimed that, notwithstanding the Reagan Administration’s disavowal of
that Protocol, the Carter Administration’s signature continues to bind the
United States to various obligations, such as limitations on the use of
weaponry.40
These commentators assume that signing a treaty obligates a nation to
comply either with the treaty as a whole or with its “important” or “core”
provisions. Professors Goodman and Jinks have expressly asserted the latter
position, contending that “[a]s a matter of international law, core treaty
obligations attach earlier in the incorporation process — that is, upon signa-
ture of the treaty.”41 These arguments are similar to arguments that have
been made with respect to a different “object and purpose” restriction in the
Vienna Convention — the preclusion of reservations to a treaty that are
“incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”42
39. See, e.g., Bill Gertz, Albright Says U.S. Bound by Nuke Pact, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at A1
(quoting letter from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to foreign ministers referring to the United
States’ “obligations as a signatory under international law”); President William J. Clinton, Remarks at
Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Oct. 14, 1999) (“I signed that treaty, it still
binds us unless I go, in effect, and erase our name — unless the President does that and takes our name
off, we are bound by it.”), http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/101499clintonstatement.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2007); see also Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks
of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 405, 463–64 (2003)
(arguing that “resumption of U.S. testing by means of nuclear explosion would defeat the object” of the
CTBT); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 137, 139, n.15 (2000) (stating that “the United States presumably remains bound under cus-
tomary international law (as evidenced by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) to
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT,” but noting that “[w]hether
that obligation requires that the United States refrain from nuclear testing is unclear”). Senator Trent
Lott responded that “the Senate vote serves to release the United States from any possible obligations as a
signatory of the negotiated text of the treaty.” Bill Gertz, Lott Hits Clinton’s Stance on Nuke Pact, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at A1. In arguing that there continues to be an object and purpose obligation under
this treaty, some commentators have noted that the treaty remained on the Senate’s Executive Calendar
despite that body’s rejection of the treaty. See, e.g., Murphy, supra. For a discussion of the president’s
power to withdraw a treaty from Senate consideration, see David C. Scott, Presidential Power to “Un-Sign”
Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447 (2002).
40. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: A Violation of International Law?,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 107 (2002); see also Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-
Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 94 (2001) (“Although the
United States has not yet ratified Protocol I, it has signed the Protocol (during the Carter Administra-
tion), and therefore it has an international obligation ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the treaty’ pending ratification or Senate defeat.”).
41. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L.
171, 173 (2003); see also Barbara Crossette, U.N. Endorses a Treaty to Halt All Nuclear Testing, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1996, at A3 (quoting Professor Thomas Franck for the proposition that “[t]he Vienna Conven-
tion provides that between the time of signing and ratifying, a state has a legal obligation not to act in a
manner inconsistent with the agreement”) (emphasis added).
42. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 19. This broad “object and purpose” argument con- R
cerning permissible reservations has been made by the Human Rights Committee that monitors compli-
ance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Human Rights Committee,
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The practical significance of these purported signing obligations is illus-
trated by the U.S. decision to “unsign” the International Criminal Court
treaty. In making its announcement, the Bush Administration expressly
sought to preclude arguments that it was bound to assist the Court as a
result of the signature. The letter sent by the United States to the Secretary-
General stated that “the United States does not intend to become a party to
the treaty,” and that “[a]ccordingly, the United States has no legal obliga-
tions arising from its signature [of the treaty],” an apparent reference to
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention.43 That same day, in defending the
Bush Administration’s action before the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, an Administration official stated that the Administration’s
actions were “consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties.”44 In an even more direct reference to Article 18 of the Convention, the
U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues explained in a press conference that
the Administration’s announcement would help the United States preserve
its flexibility because “when one is a signatory . . . the state commits to not
taking actions that would be designed to defeat the object and the purpose
of the treaty.”45
One can only speculate about the Administration’s specific concerns relat-
ing to obligations that might have been associated with the U.S. signature.
We do know, however, that the International Criminal Court treaty requires
parties to “cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecu-
tion of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court,” and to “comply with
General Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Apr. 11, 1994). For a critique of this
claim based on the text and drafting history of Article 19, see Bradley, supra note 38, at 503–05. The R
“object and purpose” obligation under Article 18 may be narrower than the one under Article 19.
Article 18 refers to actions that “would defeat” the object and purpose of a treaty, whereas Article 19
refers to reservations that are “incompatible with” the object and purpose of a treaty. Moreover, Article
18 is focused on the interim period between signature and ratification, whereas Article 19 is focused on
the ongoing relationship between a party and a treaty it has ratified.
43. Bolton Letter, supra note 16. Before being appointed to that position, Mr. Bolton had expressed R
concern that President Clinton’s signature of the International Criminal Court treaty would bind the
United States not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. See John R. Bolton, Editorial, Unsign
That Treaty, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2001, at A21; see also John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in Interna-
tional Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 47–48 (2000) (expressing concern about the
Clinton Administration’s claim that the United States was still bound by the object and purpose of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty despite the Senate’s rejection of it); John R. Bolton, Should We Take
Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 211–12 (2000) (criticizing the Clinton Administra-
tion’s reliance on the object and purpose of the treaty after it had been rejected by the Senate).
44. Marc Grossman, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/9949.htm.
In a separate statement, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained several concerns that the Ad-
ministration had about the treaty: “the lack of adequate checks and balances on powers of the ICC
prosecutors and judges; the dilution of the U.N. Security Council’s authority over international criminal
prosecutions; and the lack of an effective mechanism to prevent politicized prosecutions of American
servicemembers and officials.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the
ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=
3337.
45. Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Issues, Foreign Press Center Briefing
(May 6, 2002), available at http://fpc.state.gov/9965.htm.
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requests for arrest and surrender.”46 It is conceivable that, as a signatory, the
United States would have been called on to assist the court by, for example,
extraditing a suspect who was within U.S. jurisdiction or by providing evi-
dence within U.S. control. The Administration may well have had this sort
of obligation in mind, since the same day that the Administration an-
nounced that it would not become a party to the treaty, the State Depart-
ment’s ambassador for war crimes stated that the court “should not expect
any support or cooperation from the United States government. If the prose-
cutor of the [court] seeks to build a case against an individual, the prosecu-
tor should build the case on his or her own effort and not be dependent or
reliant upon U.S. information or cooperation.”47
The Bush Administration might also have been concerned that its plan to
conclude non-surrender agreements with individual nations, whereby na-
tions promise not to deliver U.S. personnel to the International Criminal
Court, would be viewed as an effort to defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty. The United States has now concluded non-surrender agreements with
approximately 100 countries.48 In doing so, the United States has sought to
obtain the benefit of Article 98(2) of the International Criminal Court
treaty, which provides that the Court:
may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under interna-
tional agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giv-
ing of consent for the surrender.49
Some commentators have suggested, however, that the non-surrender agree-
ments violate the object and purpose of the treaty.50
46. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, arts. 86, 89. R
47. Prosper, supra note 45. Congress subsequently enacted the American Servicemembers’ Protection R
Act of 2002, which broadly precludes federal, state, and local government assistance to the ICC. See Pub.
L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 899 (2002). The Act also authorizes the president to use “all means necessary
and appropriate” to obtain the release of U.S. and allied soldiers and government employees detained or
imprisoned by or on behalf of the court. Id. § 2008.
48. See Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm; U.S. Department of State, Article 98
Agreements and the International Criminal Court, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/art98/ (last visited Mar.
18, 2007). The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 116 Stat. 899, prohibits certain types of
assistance to countries that refuse to conclude Article 98 agreements with the United States. The presi-
dent has the authority under the Act, however, to waive the prohibition, and he has done so for some
countries. See, e.g., Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the U.S. Sec’y of State, Waiving
Prohibition on United States Military Assistance with Respect to Various Parties to the Rome Statute
Establishing the International Criminal Court (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2006/10/print/20061002-7.html.
49. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 98. R
50. See, e.g., Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1115 (2004); James
Crawford, Philippe Sands & Ralph Wilde, Joint Opinion, In the Matter of the Statute of the Interna-
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III. THE TREATY CLAUSE AND THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT POWER
The imposition of international obligations based on the signature of a
treaty poses a constitutional issue for the United States. Article II of the
Constitution specifies a process that requires the president to obtain the
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in order to make treaty com-
mitments.51 Like the bicameralism and presentment requirements for federal
legislation, the procedural requirements for making treaties are part of the
Constitution’s checks and balances.52 Moreover, under current case law, trea-
ties are not subject to the same federalism limitations that apply to federal
legislation,53 making the process requirements particularly significant.54
The Founders had a number of reasons for requiring the advice and con-
sent of the Senate for treatymaking, including their desires to protect state
interests, check executive power, and limit the number of international com-
mitments into which the country entered.55 As Alexander Hamilton ex-
plained in Federalist No. 75, it was thought essential at the Founding that
both the president and a portion of the legislature participate in the treaty
process:
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of
foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in
those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and the oper-
ation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the
tional Criminal Court and In the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under
Article 98(2) of the Statute (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_
justice/Art98_061403.pdf. Because of its notification that it does not intend to become a party to the
treaty, the United States is not bound to the object and purpose obligation for that treaty. Commentators
have argued, however, that nations that are parties or signatories to the treaty are violating international
law if they sign these agreements with the United States.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
52. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and
Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 918 (2004); cf. Clinton v. New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating Line Item Veto Act based on failure to comply with procedural
requirements for legislation); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto provision
based on failure to comply with procedural requirements for legislation).
53. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). For academic discussion of the relationship
between the treaty power and U.S. federalism, compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley (1998)], Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000), and Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing
the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation:
The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000),
and Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003).
54. See, e.g., David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1963 (2003).
55. See generally Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study,
1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 233 (1984); Charles Warren, The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271 (1934).
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whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making
them.56
Hamilton further contended that, “[h]owever proper or safe it may be in
governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to
commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly
unsafe and improper to intrust [the treaty] power to an elective magistrate
of four years’ duration.”57 The object and purpose obligation embodied in
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, however, appears to contemplate the
imposition of binding international commitments through the “elective
magistrate’s” unilateral act of signature. Moreover, because Article 18 im-
poses no time limitation on ratification, these commitments may continue
for many years.58
To be sure, it is difficult to argue that the Article II treaty process is the
only way in which the United States can constitutionally enter into binding
international agreements. The Constitution, in limiting state involvement
in foreign affairs, refers not only to “Treaties” — the term used in Article II
— but also to “Agreements” and “Compacts,” thus suggesting that there
may be some international agreements that are not subject to the Article II
process.59 In fact, the United States has entered into many binding interna-
tional agreements during its history without going through the Article II
process. This practice has been especially prevalent in the period since
World War II, during which time the vast majority of international agree-
ments entered into by the United States have not gone through the two-
thirds senatorial consent process. Indeed, in the fifty-year period between
1939 and 1989, the United States entered into 11,698 “executive agree-
ments” (agreements concluded outside of the Article II process) and only
702 Article II treaties.60 This sort of longstanding historical practice is often
56. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also JO-
SEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 557 (1833) (“The president
is the immediate author and finisher of all treaties . . . . But no treaty, so formed, becomes binding upon
the country, unless it receives the deliberate assent of two thirds of the senate.”); HENRY WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1836) (“In some republics, as in that of the United States of
America, the advice and consent of the senate is essential to enable the chief executive magistrate to
pledge the national faith in this form.”).
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 56, at 451; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, 419 (Alexander R
Hamilton) (distinguishing the proposed president from the British monarch and noting that the presi-
dent, unlike the British monarch, could not make treaties on his own).
58. The president’s role in triggering signing obligations is distinguishable from his role in the for-
mation of general rules of customary international law. Although the president can take actions along
with other nations that may affect the development of customary international law, he cannot unilaterally
create customary international law obligations for the United States.
59. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133
(1998). The Constitution completely prohibits states from entering into any “Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation,” and requires them to obtain congressional consent before entering into any “Agreement or
Compact.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
60. See CRS Study, supra note 24, at 39. R
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given significant weight in constitutional interpretation, especially in the
area of foreign affairs.61
A large majority of U.S. executive agreements have been congressional-
executive agreements, that is, agreements made with the ex ante or ex post
approval of a majority of Congress.62 Nevertheless, there are a number of
examples of what are called “sole executive agreements,” that is, interna-
tional agreements concluded solely by the president. Although many sole
executive agreements have concerned relatively minor or routine matters,
some of them have had significant effect, and several Supreme Court deci-
sions have held that these agreements (primarily involving settlement of
claims and recognition of foreign governments) are not only binding on the
United States internationally but also operate domestically as preemptive
federal law.63 It is arguable that the obligations associated with the execu-
tive signature of a treaty are analogous to those created by sole executive
agreements.
There has been significant academic debate over the legitimacy of con-
gressional-executive agreements.64 Although most commentators accept that
these agreements are at least sometimes constitutionally valid, many com-
mentators believe that the congressional-executive agreement power is nar-
rower than the Article II treaty power. These commentators note, for
example, that despite the frequent use of congressional-executive agree-
ments, presidents generally have not attempted to use them for subjects
such as human rights or arms control, and the Senate has indicated that it
would resist such an attempt.65 Rather, congressional-executive agreements
61. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936).
62. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXEC-
UTIVE REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1977) (finding that in the period 1946–1972, 88.3%
of executive agreements were based at least in part on statutory authority, 6.2% were based on treaties,
and 5.5% were based solely on executive authority); C.H. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the
United States II, 43 MINN. L. REV. 651, 721 (1959) (concluding that only 5.9% of executive agreements
entered into between 1938 and 1957 were based exclusively on the president’s constitutional authority).
63. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (settlement of war-related claims); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (settlement of claims against foreign nation as part of resolution
of hostage crisis); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (agreement giving effect to Soviet property
claims as part of recognition of Soviet Union); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (same as
Pink).
64. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1995), and David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998), with
Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).
65. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86
CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 961 (2001); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agree-
ments, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001); see also CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 473-74, 477 (2d ed. 2006) (documenting Senate insistence that
significant arms control agreements be concluded pursuant to the Article II process). But see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1 , at § 303 cmt. e R
(1987) (suggesting that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are completely interchangeable).
\\server05\productn\H\HLI\48-2\HLI203.txt unknown Seq: 16  5-JUL-07 14:13
322 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 48
are most commonly used for agreements relating to international trade and
commerce, areas in which Congress has particularly broad authority.66 More-
over, there are a number of examples in which presidents have used the
Article II senatorial consent process, rather than congressional-executive
agreements, even though that process reduced the likelihood of legislative
approval of the treaty — for example, with respect to the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.67
Regardless of how one comes out on the proper scope of congressional-
executive agreements, there are much stronger reasons for concluding that
the sole executive agreement power is narrower than the Article II treaty
power. Sole executive agreements are not subject to the process requirements
for congressional-executive agreements, namely congressional approval. Nor
do they benefit from the same historical gloss, since they have been used
much less often than congressional-executive agreements. Because sole exec-
utive agreements are not authorized by Congress, they fall into a lower cate-
gory of presidential power under Justice Jackson’s influential framework
from the Youngstown steel seizure case. Under that framework, presidential
power is at its highest when the president acts with the approval of Con-
gress, as is the case with congressional-executive agreements, but is in a
lower, intermediate category when the president acts without such approval,
as is the case with sole executive agreements.68
For these reasons, although there is much academic debate about execu-
tive agreements, almost all commentators agree that the president’s power
to enter into sole executive agreements is narrower than the United States’
power to enter into Article II treaties. Professor Louis Henkin, who is other-
wise supportive of executive agreements, especially congressional-executive
agreements, describes the proposition that sole executive agreements are
completely interchangeable with Article II treaties as “unacceptable, for it
would wholly remove the ‘check’ of Senate consent which the Framers strug-
gled and compromised to write into the Constitution.”69 Many commenta-
In 1999, the full Congress passed legislation that prohibits the United States from becoming a party to
the ICC by any means other than by an Article II treaty. See 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
66. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1319–22 (N.D. Ala.
1999), vacated by 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001).
67. It seems unlikely, therefore, that presidents have complete freedom of discretion in choosing
whether to conclude an agreement as an Article II treaty or an executive agreement, as some commenta-
tors have assumed. See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling
Devices, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 440 (2005); John K. Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratifi-
cation Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5
(2002).
68. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring); see
also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) (citing Justice Jackson’s concurrence).
69. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 222 (2d ed. 1996); see
also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 649 (3d ed. 2000) (“That the power to
conclude executive agreements coincides perfectly with the treaty power is untenable . . . since such a
conclusion would emasculate the structurally crucial senatorial check on executive discretion that the
Framers so carefully embodied in the Constitution.”).
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tors assume, therefore, that sole executive agreements are valid only if they
are related to an independent constitutional power of the president, such as
the president’s implied power to determine which governments the United
States recognizes, the president’s powers as Commander-in-Chief, or the
president’s power to receive ambassadors.70 Others claim that such agree-
ments are valid only if they involve one-time or short-term commitments.71
These limitations are at least roughly consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decisions that have approved sole executive agreements.72 The agreement at
issue in the Belmont and Pink cases related to U.S. recognition of the Soviet
Union and thus concerned the president’s recognition power.73 The agree-
ment at issue in Dames & Moore concerned the resolution of the Iranian hos-
tage crisis and thus was arguably related to the Commander-in-Chief power.
In addition, the agreements in each of these three cases involved the one-
time settlement of claims against a foreign government.74
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi does not change this conclusion about the limitations of sole ex-
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 1, at § 303(4) (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED R
STATES § 121 (1965); CRS Study, supra note 24, at 26. An early sole executive agreement relating to the R
Commander-in-Chief power was an agreement made by President Madison with Great Britain during the
War of 1812 concerning treatment of prisoners of war. See Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., May 12, 1813 , reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1818, at 557 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931). For debate over whether the Article
II “vesting clause” (which provides that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America”) is also a source of presidential power, compare Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (arguing that it is),
with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545 (2004) (arguing that it is not).
71. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 59. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), the Supreme
Court held that Vermont could not extradite a criminal suspect to Canada because, even though the
extradition arrangement did not constitute a formal “treaty,” it did constitute an “agreement” and thus
was precluded by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution because of the absence of congressional author-
ization. A plurality of the Court quoted Vattel’s description of “treaties” as compacts made “either for
perpetuity, or for a considerable time” and his statement that “[t]he compacts which have temporary
matters for their object, are called agreements, conventions, and pactions. They are accomplished by one
single act, and not by repeated acts.” Id. at 572; see also 3 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 160 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1916) (1758). A
classic example of a one-time agreement is a claims settlement. For documentation of the longstanding
practice of settlement of claims through executive agreement, see, for example, SAMUEL B. CRANDALL,
TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 85-87 (1904); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Defer-
ence: International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2003). A common short-term
agreement is a modus vivendi, which is “an instrument recording an international agreement of temporary
or provisional nature intended to be replaced by an arrangement of a more permanent and detailed
character.” U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, TREATY REFERENCE GUIDE (1999), available at http://untreaty.un.
org/English/guide.pdf. For examples of modi vivendi accomplished through executive agreement, see
CRANDALL, supra, at 87-88.
72. See cases cited supra note 63.
73. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
229; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political recognition is
exclusively a function of the Executive.”).
74. It is also worth noting that Congress appears to have acquiesced in the longstanding practice of
presidential settlement of claims. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680–81 (1981).
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ecutive agreements. In Garamendi, the Supreme Court held that a California
statute was preempted because it posed an obstacle to the achievement of
executive branch policy that was embodied in certain executive agreements
relating to the settlement of Holocaust-era claims.75 Although the case in-
volved binding international agreements, there is language in the Court’s
opinion that could be read as suggesting that the executive might have the
unilateral power to preempt state law in foreign affairs. In particular, the
Court noted that “at some point an exercise of state power that touches on
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy” and that
“there is executive authority to decide what that policy should be.”76 De-
spite this broad language, the Court did not suggest that the executive had
unlimited authority, even through executive agreements, to preempt state
law. Indeed, in observing that “valid executive agreements are fit to pre-
empt state law, just as treaties are,”77 the Court can be read as suggesting
that there are limits on the circumstances in which sole executive agree-
ments will be found valid.78 More importantly, the Court emphasized that
the executive agreements at issue concerned the settlement of claims, and
that the use of “executive agreements to settle claims of American nationals
against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding practice” which
“has received congressional acquiescence throughout its history.”79 If the
sole executive agreement power were plenary, the Court would not have
needed to emphasize the historical support for, and congressional acceptance
of, this type of agreement.
In sum, it seems likely that there are significant limitations on the presi-
dent’s unilateral ability to bind the United States to international obliga-
tions. For example, even if the United States could constitutionally enter
into a treaty to abolish the death penalty,80 the president presumably would
lack the power on his own, as a matter of domestic law, to obligate the
United States to abolish the death penalty. Such a commitment would not
fall within his independent constitutional powers, especially with respect to
the use of the death penalty at the state level. Nor is there historical practice
supporting the use of sole executive agreements, or even congressional-exec-
utive agreements, for such human rights obligations. Assuming this argu-
75. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
76. Id. at 415.
77. Id. at 416.
78. See also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682 (noting that “the President does have some measure of
power to enter into executive agreements”) (emphasis added).
79. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415. The dissenters further noted that the Court’s “cases do not catalog
the subject matter meet for executive agreement, but we have repeatedly acknowledged the President’s
authority to make such agreements to settle international claims.” Id. at 436 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. It is possible that Congress lacks the power to abolish the death penalty at the state level. Cf.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause in criminalizing the possession of firearms near schools). The Supreme Court has held,
however, that the treaty power is not limited to the scope of Congress’s legislative powers. See Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). It is uncertain whether there are any subject matter limitations on the
treaty power. See Bradley (1998), supra note 53, at 429–33. R
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ment is correct, the president similarly should not have the authority to
bind the United States to these sorts of obligations as a result of the pur-
ported object and purpose obligation associated with signing a treaty. This
problem does not go away simply because the president may be able to
“unsign” an unratified treaty, since that possibility simply gives more au-
thority to the executive and thus does not address the lack of senatorial
consent.
For these reasons, Professor Michael Glennon’s claim that “[t]he Presi-
dent clearly possesses the authority to sign treaties and in view of the effect
accorded signature by international law . . . may constitutionally infer from
that signature the further authority to act so as not to defeat the object or
purpose of a signed treaty”81 is questionable. Although Professor Glennon
proceeds to qualify his claim by stating that the president “cannot exceed
his own independent powers,”82 the effect of this qualification is unclear,
since he also states that “these powers are again properly viewed as encom-
passing the authority to carry out obligations incurred by the United States
by virtue of its status as a treaty signatory.”83 In other words, it is doubtful
that Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, by virtue of its purported status
as customary international law, has increased the president’s constitutional
authority. By analogy, if customary international law started treating signa-
ture as constituting consent to be fully bound by a treaty, that treatment
would not give the president the domestic authority to start ratifying trea-
ties unilaterally through his signature. Instead, he presumably would need
to obtain the Senate’s advice and consent before engaging in signature. It
might be different if the signing obligation had existed under customary
international law when the Constitution was drafted and ratified, because it
could be argued that the Constitution was implicitly granting the president
this background authority by virtue of his role in the treaty process. As
discussed below, however, the drafting history of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties shows that the signing obligation is of more modern
origin.
Nevertheless, there are some obligations to which the president could
presumably commit unilaterally by his signature. As the Court noted in
Garamendi, “the President has a degree of independent authority to act” in
the area of foreign affairs.84 Thus, for example, as Commander-in-Chief, the
president might be able to make a binding commitment not to test or use
certain weapons, at least in the absence of a contrary directive from Con-
gress, and at least for the duration of his administration. President Reagan
made such a commitment in the context of the SALT II Treaty. Although
President Reagan announced that the United States would not ratify that
81. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 173 (1990).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 539 U.S. at 415.
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treaty,85 he also stated that the United States would voluntarily “refrain
from actions which undercut [the treaty] so long as the Soviet Union shows
equal restraint”86 — a decision that may have been within his independent
powers as Commander-in-Chief. An analogous issue is the power of the pres-
ident to direct provisional application of at least some treaties prior to their
ratification. With respect to that issue, the State Department has stated that
such provisional application is proper so long as the obligations undertaken
are “obligations within the President’s competence under U.S. law.”87
To return to the example of the International Criminal Court treaty, it
seems unlikely, under the above analysis, that President Clinton could have
constitutionally bound the United States to extradite suspects to the court.
Unlike the command of troops or the recognition of foreign governments, it
is difficult to argue that the president has an independent power of extradi-
tion. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly held that extradition can be
accomplished only by means of a treaty or statute.88 As the Court has ex-
plained, “there is no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the
individual.”89 President Clinton might have had the independent power to
commit the United States to other obligations, however, such as providing
evidence within the federal government’s control — perhaps pursuant to his
Article II authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”
(since the evidence would facilitate the enforcement of international crimi-
nal law). The principal point, however, is that he would not have had unlim-
ited constitutional authority to bind the United States to assist the
International Criminal Court merely by his act of signature.90
85. See supra text accompanying note 12. R
86. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at Memorial Day Ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery
(May 31, 1982), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/53182A.htm.
87. Written Reply of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Questions
Presented by Senator Jacob K. Javits, in Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 917, 932 (1980); see also CRS Study, supra note 24 at 113–16;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at § 312 R
reporters’ note 7 (1987) (“Provisional commitment . . . reflects an understanding that the President has
some implied authority to commit the United States on a provisional basis. How far that authority
extends is not clear . . . .”).
88. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936) (stating that extradition “is
not confided to the Executive in the absence of treaty or legislative provision”). But see QUINCY WRIGHT,
THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 237 (1922) (noting two controversial examples of
unilateral executive extraditions).
89. Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9. In the Jonathan Robbins case, in which John Marshall famously defended
the authority of President Adams to extradite a suspect to Great Britain, the president was relying on the
U.S.-British extradition treaty. See John Marshall, Address Before the House of Representatives (Mar. 7,
1800), in 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 613–14 (1851); see also Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyr-
dom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
90. Customary international law might impose obligations on the United States even when the presi-
dent acts beyond his domestic constitutional authority. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 46 R
(allowing for only a narrow ultra vires defense to treaty obligations). But these obligations would not be
effective domestically in the United States, since, whatever its status in the U.S. legal system, customary
international law does not trump the Constitution. For a description of the academic debates over the
domestic status of customary international law, see Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H.
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The following diagram illustrates the potential for conflict between the
constitutional requirements for making international agreements and possi-
ble international obligations that attach upon signature of a treaty. The left
circle represents agreements that require either two-thirds senatorial consent
(the Article II treaty process) or legislative consent (congressional-executive
agreements), the right circle represents international obligations associated
with signing a treaty, and the overlap between the two circles represents the
potential constitutional conflict.
International
Signing
Obligations
Senate or
Legislative
Consent
Required
IV. DRAFTING HISTORY OF ARTICLE 18
The extent to which there is a potential conflict between international
law and the U.S. constitutional process for making treaty commitments de-
pends on the breadth of the Article 18 object and purpose obligation. The
less significant the object and purpose obligation, the less likely it is that
the signing obligation will exceed the president’s unilateral authority. The
drafting history of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention suggests that this
obligation is narrower than some commentators assume.91 Instead of impos-
ing an obligation to comply with either the treaty as a whole or its “core” or
“important” terms, the drafters of Article 18 appear to have intended to
preclude only actions that would substantially undermine the ability of the
parties to comply with, or benefit from, the treaty after ratification. For
Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869
(2007).
91. Because the meaning of Article 18 is ambiguous, it is appropriate, even under the terms of the
Vienna Convention itself, to look to supplementary evidence of its meaning, including drafting history.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of inter- R
pretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion . . . to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to [textual and related sources] leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure . . . .”); see also AUST, supra note 22, at 197 (“The preparatory work . . . of R
a treaty is not a primary means of interpretation, but it is an important supplementary means.”). Courts
in the United States regularly look to drafting history when interpreting treaties. See, e.g., Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 225–28 (1996).
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many treaties, it is difficult to conceive of actions that would have this
effect.
A 1935 Harvard research project that attempted to codify international
law, the treaty portions of which were an early precursor to the Vienna Con-
vention, stated that a signatory nation was “under no duty to perform the
obligations stipulated” in the treaty until the nation ratified the treaty, but
that “under some circumstances” the nation would be obligated as a matter
of “good faith” to “refrain from taking action which would render performance
by any party of the obligations stipulated impossible or more difficult.” 92 Subse-
quently, the International Law Commission of the United Nations, led by a
series of four prominent Rapporteurs, spent two decades drafting the Vienna
Convention building on the work of the Harvard research project.93
The first Rapporteur, J.L. Brierly, concluded that even the modest obliga-
tion referred to in the Harvard research project was moral rather than legal
in nature.94 He subsequently explained that, while “[a] certain amount of
material exists concerning an alleged obligation on the part of States not to
do anything, between the signature of a treaty on their behalf, and its ratifi-
cation, that would render ratification by other States superfluous or useless,”
the material supporting even this narrow obligation was “of too fragmentary
and inconclusive a nature to form the basis of codification.”95 Perhaps not
surprisingly, in light of the position of the Rapporteur, the possibility of
including such an obligation in the proposed treaty was initially rejected.96
Even the leading supporter during the discussion of including such an obli-
gation emphasized that it would simply prohibit nations from taking ac-
tions “calculated to make the ratification of the treaty impossible.” 97
A subsequent Rapporteur, Hersch Lauterpacht, believed that the obliga-
tion did have legal status, but described the obligation narrowly as “pro-
hibit[ing] action in bad faith deliberately aimed at depriving the other party of
92. Codification of International Law: Part III – Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 778 (Supp.
1935) (emphasis added); see also SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
344 (2d ed. 1916) (stating that a treaty “is in good faith provisionally binding from the date of signing
in the sense that neither party may, without repudiating the proposed treaty, voluntarily place itself in a
position where it cannot comply with the conditions as they existed at the time the treaty was signed.”)
(emphasis added); JONES, supra note 25, at 81 (“It has also been suggested that a State must not do R
anything between signature and ratification that would render ratification superfluous or useless. . . .
There is no evidence in the practice of States to prove the existence of any such rule.”).
93. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA.
J. INT’L L. 281, 289–91 (1988).
94. See Summary Records of the 3rd Session, [1951] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1951; Documents of the 3rd Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,
[1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add. 1; see also CAMARA, supra note
27, at 63 (“[T]he rule laid down by the Harvard Research Group embodies no principle of International R
Law. It belongs to the vague and dubious field of international morals.”).
95. Documents of the 4th Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1952] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 54, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1952/Add. 1.
96. See Summary Records of the 3rd Session, [1951] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 39-42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1951.
97. Id. at 42 (comments of Jesu´s M. Yepes from Columbia) (emphasis added).
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the benefits which it legitimately hoped to achieve from the treaty and for
which it gave adequate consideration.”98 The subsequent Rapporteurs, Ger-
ald Fitzmaurice and Humphrey Waldock, continued to focus on actions that
would impair the ability of the parties to comply with or obtain the benefits
of the treaty.99 Waldock, for example, referred to an obligation to “refrain
during at least some period from acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the
treaty.”100
This drafting history suggests that the object and purpose obligation is
designed to ensure that one of the signatory parties, typically in a bilateral
arrangement, does not change the status quo in a way that eliminates or
substantially undermines the reasons for entering into the treaty.101 A para-
digmatic example would be a situation in which a treaty called for the re-
turn of certain objects, and a signatory destroyed the objects before
ratification.102 A similar example would be a situation in which a treaty
called for ceding certain territory to another state, but a signatory nation
ceded the territory to some other state in the meantime.103 A less certain
example, but one potentially encompassed by this view of the object and
purpose obligation, would be a situation in which a treaty called for the
parties to reduce their armaments (such as nuclear weapons) by a certain
percentage, and one of the signatories secretly and substantially increased its
overall armaments prior to ratification. Whatever its precise implications,
the object and purpose obligation under this view does not suggest either a
general obligation to comply with a signed treaty, or an obligation to com-
ply with its “important” or “core” provisions.104
98. Documents of the 5th Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1953] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 110, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (emphasis added). As this statement
suggests, the drafters of the object and purpose obligation may have had in mind primarily bilateral
rather than multilateral treaties. See also, e.g., Summary Records of the 1st Part of the 17th Session, [1965] 1
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965 (comments of Roberto Ago, delegate from
Italy) (“When drafting [what became Article 18] the Commission had been thinking mainly of bilateral
treaties.”).
99. See Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry Into Force: Toward Manifest
Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 308–13 (2001).
100. Documents of the 14th Session Including the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1962] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 110, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1 (emphasis added).
101. See also, e.g., AUST, supra note 22, at 94 (“The signatory state must therefore not do anything R
which would affect its ability fully to comply with the treaty once it has entered into force.”); Written
Reply of Mark B. Feldman, supra note 87, at 733 (“In the majority of cases the obligation not to defeat R
the object and purposes of the treaty means a duty to refrain from taking steps that would render
impossible future application of the treaty when ratified.”).
102. See AUST, supra note 22, at 94. R
103. See id. at 94–95.
104. There is no analogue to even the narrow version of the Article 18 obligation under domestic
principles of agency law. Under that law, when an agent signs a contract but lacks the authority to bind
the principal, the principal has no interim legal obligation as a result of the signature. See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4 (2006). Although there are circumstances under which “precon-
tractual liability” will be imposed under contract law, “[i]n the absence of sufficient evidence that the
parties intended to be legally bound in some way, courts generally conclude that the parties have en-
gaged merely in preliminary negotiations and do not impose liability for inducing reliance absent mis-
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The narrow construction of the signing obligation suggested by the draft-
ing history is consistent with the text of Article 18. The text does not pro-
vide that nations must comply with a treaty they have signed, or even that
they must comply with some of its terms. Instead, it simply provides that
signing nations must not take actions that would “defeat” the “object and
purpose” of the treaty. Furthermore, the Vienna Convention provides sepa-
rately for provisional application of treaties that are not yet in force, sug-
gesting that Article 18 was not intended to mandate such application.105
A broader construction of Article 18 would undermine the significance of
ratification, which today represents the usual manifestation of consent to be
bound. As one commentator explains:
It is sometimes argued that a state which has not yet ratified a treaty
must, in accordance with Article 18, nevertheless comply with it, or, at
least, do nothing inconsistent with its provisions. The argument is
clearly wrong, since the act of ratification would then have no purpose
because the obligations to perform the treaty would not then be depen-
dent on ratification.106
The tension between a broad Article 18 obligation and constitutional sys-
tems like the United States that divide the treaty power is another reason for
construing it narrowly.107
Furthermore, it is far from clear that, even from the perspective of the
international system, a broad signing obligation would be desirable. Among
other things, a broad obligation might cause states to be less willing to sign
treaties in the first instance or to more readily disavow signatures. Indeed,
broad claims about the signing obligation might have contributed to the
Bush Administration’s controversial decision to “unsign” the International
Criminal Court treaty.108 The usefulness of a broad signing obligation in
addressing strategic bargaining problems is also unclear, given the vague
nature of the “object and purpose” test, the difficulty of enforcing the obli-
gation, the ability of states to terminate the effect of a signature, and the
lack of a duty to ratify.109 Moreover, the purported bargaining problems
concern reliance by other states on the act of signing, but the extent of such
representation, express promise, or similar inducement.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual
Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 n.4 (2007).
105. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 25. R
106. AUST, supra note 22, at 94; see also Klabbers, supra note 99, at 293–94 (“[T]o hold that a viola- R
tion of a provision of a treaty prior to its entry into force would defeat the treaty’s object and purpose is
tantamount to saying that the treaty actually assumes legal force upon signature rather than upon
ratification.”).
107. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Unratified Treaties and Other Unperfected Acts in International Law: Consti-
tutional Functions, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 729, 743 (2002) (“Ratification of treaties in republican
systems such as that found in the United States is a critical bulwark of separation of powers and checks
and balances. If the international system henceforth assigns legal validity to unratified treaties, that
bulwark will be breached.”).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 43–50.
109. See Swaine, supra note 32, at 2078–83. R
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reliance would be affected by the background legal rule; if signing does not
carry significant obligations, there would be less reliance on signature.
While it is conceivable that states could obtain concessions in multilateral
treaty negotiations even though they had no good faith expectation of ratify-
ing the treaty, states are repeat players in treaty negotiations and would
presumably face reputational costs (and less ability to obtain concessions in
the future) if they were perceived as acting in bad faith.110 Furthermore, a
broad signing obligation would not prevent this sort of strategic behavior,
since a state could wait until negotiations were concluded and then decide
not to sign, or sign and then disavow the signature.111
There may not be many object and purpose obligations, viewed in the
narrow terms discussed above, that fall outside of the president’s indepen-
dent powers to act. For example, if the United States were acting contrary to
a provision in a human rights treaty by continuing to employ the death
penalty, its actions would not undermine either its own or other nations’
future compliance with the treaty, since the United States could always stop
the death penalty after ratifying the treaty.112 To return again to the Inter-
national Criminal Court treaty, the United States may not have had any
significant obligations to the Court by virtue of its mere signature of the
treaty.113 If so, there may be an irony here whereby exaggerated claims about
the object and purpose obligation helped push the United States to publicly
disassociate itself from the treaty (although there were of course other rea-
sons for the U.S. action).114
110. See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (discussing somewhat analogous reputational issues between the president
and Congress associated with presidential signing statements).
111. A better way of addressing strategic concerns like this one would be to include a clause in the
treaty stating that it will not take effect unless and until certain states ratify it. There is a provision like
this, for example, in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons art. IX, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (requiring
ratification by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, along with forty other nations,
before the treaty would take effect).
112. It could be argued that a continued use of the death penalty by the United States after its
signature of a treaty banning the death penalty would involve a form of irreversibility, since the punish-
ment is obviously irreversible for the individuals executed. The executed individuals, however, would not
be covered by the treaty (since the United States would not be a party to the treaty until ratification), and
the United States’ ability to comply with the treaty after ratification would not have been impaired by
the pre-ratification executions, just as its ability to comply with the treaty would not have been impaired
by executions carried out prior to its signature of the treaty. This argument assumes, as would normally
be the case, that the treaty addresses itself only to a class of individuals and not to particular individuals.
113. For the ICC treaty, however, it is arguable that the U.S. practice of concluding non-surrender
agreements would impair the ability of the parties to obtain the benefits of the treaty, if those benefits
include equal exposure to possible prosecution. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.
114. The effort to increase the obligations on signatory nations can be seen as part of a more general
effort by advocacy groups, international institutions, and some scholars to relax formal and consent-based
requirements for the imposition of international obligations. Other examples might include a less prac-
tice-based conception of customary international law, restrictions on the ability of nations to opt out of
customary international law, concepts of jus cogens norms that are binding without regard to state con-
sent, and severability of purportedly invalid treaty reservations. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 540–41. R
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More generally, the object and purpose obligation appears to have little
relevance to certain types of treaties, such as human rights treaties. Human
rights treaties are not reciprocal in the traditional sense, since nations do not
receive direct benefits from other nations’ compliance, and noncompliance
by other nations has little effect on a nation’s ability to comply. As a result,
for these treaties, it is difficult to envision pre-ratification conduct that
would substantially undermine the ability of the treaty parties to comply
with, or benefit from, the treaty. Even if a nation enacted new human rights
restrictions after signature, this would not prevent it from repealing those
restrictions once it ratifies the treaty.
Nevertheless, there is probably still some potential for conflict between
the Constitution and the object and purpose obligation, since the drafters of
Article 18 were not specifically focused on U.S. constitutional requirements.
As a result, if the United States does eventually ratify the Vienna Conven-
tion, the Senate may wish to include an understanding with its advice and
consent that clarifies the obligation imposed by Article 18.115 Although Ar-
ticle 18 was not historically the focus of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee’s concerns about the Vienna Convention, the concerns that the
Committee did have are relevant to this issue. Article 46 of the Convention
precludes a nation from invoking a violation of its internal law as a basis for
invalidating a treaty unless the violation was “manifest and concerned a rule
of its internal law of fundamental importance.” The Committee was con-
cerned that this article might bind the United States to international agree-
ments made by the president without the two-thirds Senate consent
required by Article II of the Constitution (because that requirement might
not be considered “manifest” given the extensive U.S. practice of conclud-
ing agreements outside of this process).116 The Committee proposed that the
Senate give its advice and consent to the Convention subject to an under-
standing and interpretation providing that the two-thirds Senate consent
requirement is an internal law of the United States of fundamental impor-
tance and that no treaty as defined by the Vienna Convention would be valid
in the absence of either such Senate consent or approval by Congress.117 The
State Department found the understanding and interpretation to be unac-
ceptable, presumably because it wanted to preserve the executive branch’s
historic ability to enter into executive agreements, and efforts to work out a
compromise were not successful.118 The Article 18 object and purpose obli-
115. For a discussion of the validity of reservations, understandings, and declarations, see Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399
(2000).
116. See CRS Study, supra note 24, at 46–47; Frankowska, supra note 93, at 295–98. R
117. See CRS Study, supra note 24, at 46. R
118. See id. at 43–49; see also CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1981-1988, at 1236-37; The Law of Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1974 DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 195–98.
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gation, as we have seen, implicates a related concern, by legitimizing inter-
national obligations created through executive action.
Of course, if Article 18 reflects customary international law, then it may
not matter for this purpose whether the United States ratifies the Vienna
Convention.119 There is substantial debate and uncertainty, however, about
whether and to what extent Article 18 does reflect customary international
law.120 Here there may be a further irony. The Bush Administration’s state-
ments regarding the International Criminal Court treaty, which have been
heavily criticized as antithetical to international law, could be read as an
acceptance of a potentially broad object and purpose obligation. In these
statements, the Administration explained that it was acting consistently
with the Vienna Convention and suggested that, by declaring its intent not
to ratify, it was ending its object and purpose obligations.121 As discussed
above, however, it is not clear what obligations there would be under the
narrow conception of Article 18 suggested by the drafting history. Moreo-
ver, the Bush Administration did not deny the binding effect of Article 18,
and, as noted above, statements by State Department officials in both the
Bush Administration and earlier administrations have suggested that Article
18 is binding as a matter of customary international law.122
The Bush Administration’s failure to oppose object and purpose obliga-
tions in this context might have been inadvertent, but it also might reflect
the different institutional perspectives of the executive branch and the Sen-
119. The relationship between signed but unratified treaties and the creation of customary interna-
tional law — an issue relevant, for example, to Alien Tort Statute litigation — is beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating, in Alien
Tort Statute case, that “only States that have ratified a treaty are legally obligated to uphold the princi-
ples embodied in that treaty, and the treaty only evidences the customs and practices of those States”).
Also beyond the scope of this Article is the relevance of unratified treaties to the interpretation of provi-
sions of the Constitution. See supra note 37 (discussing Supreme Court’s reference to an unratified treaty R
in Roper v. Simmons).
120. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 22, at 94 (“There is not only uncertainty as to whether [Article 18] R
reflects customary law, but also the extent of the obligation.”); LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 476 (4th ed. 2001) (“Whether Article 18 as it now stands is
declaratory of prior customary law is uncertain.”); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (7th ed. 1997) (“There is some authority for this rule in customary
law, but the matter is controversial.”); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES,
1945-1986, at 149 (1989) (noting that “article 18 . . . is in many circles regarded as highly controversial,
at least with regard to the question of whether it is declaratory of customary international law or is
innovative”); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 43 (2d ed. 1984)
(noting that Article 18 “in all probability constitutes at least a measure of progressive development”);
Konstantinos Magliveras & Dimitris Bourantonis, Rescinding the Signature of an International Treaty: The
United States and the Rome Statute Establishing the International Criminal Court, DIPL. & STATECRAFT, Dec.
2003, at 21, 27 (“[T]here is no uniform approach as to whether [Article 18] has the force of customary
international law or not.”).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
122. Furthermore, the Bush Administration’s action of sending a formal letter to the United Nations
terminating the effect of its signature of the International Criminal Court treaty may make it difficult for
the Administration to argue that it has no object and purpose obligation with respect to other treaties —
such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty — that it has denounced
through less formal means.
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ate. The Bush Administration, although usually worried about similar ef-
forts by international lawyers to expand the binding effect of international
law, may not be overly troubled by the object and purpose obligation be-
cause that obligation tends to enhance the executive branch’s powers. After
all, it allows the executive branch the authority, under international law at
least, to create — and, by a subsequent declaration of intent not to ratify,
repeal — binding obligations purely by unilateral action. Simply because
this sort of flexibility may serve the executive’s interests, however, does not
mean that it is not of constitutional concern, especially with respect to its
effect on the Senate’s already diminished authority over treaties.123
CONCLUSION
It is widely believed that modern international law imposes object and
purpose obligations on nations by virtue of their signing of a treaty, and
some commentators have construed these obligations broadly. These pur-
ported signing obligations raise constitutional concerns for the United
States because the obligations are in tension with the division of the treaty
power between the president and Senate. These concerns are not eliminated
by the phenomenon of sole executive agreements. They are reduced, how-
ever, if one adopts a narrow construction of Article 18 of the Vienna Con-
vention, something that is supported by the drafting history of that Article.
Even under the narrow construction of Article 18, there is likely to be
some gap between the president’s independent constitutional authority and
the international law of signing obligations, since Article 18 was not drafted
with U.S. constitutional concerns specifically in mind. As a result, it may be
desirable for the United States, when signing some treaties, to make clear
that it will not consider itself bound by the obligations in the treaty unless
and until it completes the ratification process, or for the president to seek
the Senate’s advice and consent prior to signing some treaties. In addition, if
the United States eventually ratifies the Vienna Convention, the Senate may
wish to attach an understanding to its advice and consent clarifying the
effect of Article 18.
In this light, the Bush Administration’s public act of “unsigning” the
International Criminal Court treaty also looks more defensible. As a matter
of international law, there seems to be little question that a nation is enti-
tled to declare its intention not to become a party to a treaty after signing it.
In fact, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention appears to contemplate exactly
this possibility when it states that a nation’s object and purpose obligation
continues until the nation “shall have made its intention clear not to be-
123. Whether the Senate (or at least the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) will make a serious
effort to preserve its institutional interests, as opposed to party or individual reelection interests, is a
difficult question, especially when the Senate is controlled by members of the president’s party. Cf. Daryl
J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006).
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come a party to the treaty.”124 Nor could this action have violated the famil-
iar pacta sunt servanda rule for treaties — that is, that nations are obligated to
comply with their treaty obligations in good faith — because that principle
applies only to treaties that a nation has ratified.125 In addition, there does
not seem to be any question that the executive branch is a proper institution
for making this intention clear, since it is the institution exclusively respon-
sible for signing treaties, and no treaty can be ratified without the presi-
dent’s agreement.126
Some commentators have suggested that the Bush Administration, by
publicly opposing the treaty instead of simply withholding ratification, dis-
played a lack of good faith,127 but this lack of good faith is far from clear. In
a sense, all the Administration did was openly reveal to the other treaty
parties the United States’ true intentions so that the other parties could act
accordingly.128 Viewed this way, the Bush Administration’s actions may ac-
tually reflect greater good faith than the Clinton Administration’s decision
to sign the treaty knowing that it was not likely to be accepted by either the
Senate or the incoming presidential administration.129 Moreover, in order for
a nation to terminate its obligations under Article 18, it is arguable that a
nation must give formal international notice of its intention not to ratify a
treaty. If so, the Bush Administration’s decision to send a letter to the U.N.
Secretary-General appears to be more faithful to Article 18 than other U.S.
efforts to disassociate itself with treaty signatures, such as with the Kyoto
Protocol and First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.
124. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 18; see, e.g., Hans Blix, Developing International Law and R
Inducing Compliance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (2002) (“Clearly, in the cases where signature does
not signal the state’s consent to be bound, a simple but formal announcement by a government clarifying
that it will not proceed with ratification or any other form of confirmation will be enough to terminate
the limited legal effects that flowed from the signature.”).
125. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to R
it and must be performed in good faith.”) (emphasis added).
126. In this sense, “unsigning” is a more straightforward issue of executive power than termination of
treaties that have already been ratified, since, unlike the signing power, the president shares the ratifica-
tion power with the Senate. Nevertheless, presidents have unilaterally terminated ratified treaties. For
example, President Bush announced the U.S. termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia
in 2002, and President Carter announced the termination of a defense treaty with Taiwan in 1979. In
2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
announcing that the United States was withdrawing from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations, which the United States had ratified in 1969, and which gave the Interna-
tional Court of Justice jurisdiction to decide certain disputes. For discussion of whether and to what
extent the president has authority to terminate treaties, see DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (1986); Raoul Berger, The President’s Unilateral Termination of the
Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1980); Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, Litigating the Presi-
dent’s Power to Terminate Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT’L L. 647 (1979).
127. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1508 (2003).
128. See Swaine, supra note 32, at 2062 (“Unsigning, on this view, was simply being forthright, and R
by providing more accurate information about the U.S. position, better enabled other signatories and
non-parties to promote their own interests.”).
129. The Supreme Court had decided Bush v. Gore prior to President Clinton’s signing of the treaty.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Although beyond the scope of this Article, there may be additional policy
prescriptions worth considering, both at the domestic and the international
level. The United States is not obligated to sign treaties prior to ratification,
and it may be that it should withhold its ratification more often, particu-
larly where quick ratification does not seem likely. The Senate may also
consider ways that it might reduce the number of signed but unratified
treaties.130 At the international level, it may make sense for nations to adopt
a statute of limitations for signing — such as three years — after which
time a state would no longer be regarded as a signatory. Such a limitations
period would not prevent states from joining later through accession, but it
would eliminate the uncertain limbo status that currently exists with respect
to signing, and it might even encourage more timely ratifications.
130. For suggestions of how the Senate might accomplish this, see Baker Spring & Brett D. Schaefer,
Clearing Out the Bulging Treaty In-Box, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Jan. 8, 1999, http://www.heritage.
org/Research/GovernmentReform/bg1241.cfm.
